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Originally prepared for presentation at the seminar "Society and 
Politics in Export Economies" held at the Centro Brasileiro de 
~nalise e ~lanejamento(CE~~~~), March 11-13, 1982. This is a 
preliminary' report based on a broader study'of the patterns 
of collective action enacted by Paulista coffee planters in 
the decade of the 1920's. Field work was done in SZTo Paulo 
in 1979 and 1980 with the support of the Social Science 
Research Council. The author welcomes comments and sug- 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Dorme nene 
,. Que a cuca vem pegar 
Papai est6 na roqa 
Mam3e no cafezal. 
(Paulista lullaby) 
At the turn of the decade of the 19201s, the coffee planters 
of SZo Paulo--the world's largest coffee export sector--engaged 
in a surprising flurry of contentious behavior and conflict. In 
less than two years of ferment two major associations were formed 
and an equal number of major coffee congresses held, while an or- 
ganizational drive on the part of the most vociferous new as- 
sociation resulted in more than 85 new local chapters in the in- 
terior of the state by 1923. Prompted by a sharp fall in the 
price of coffee in 1920-21, the articulated grievances and claims 
covered a wider range of issues--particularly lack of manpower, 
credit, planter organization and governmental responsiveness to 
the plight of planters. Feelings ran so high that on the congress 
of March of 1921 an outright threat of political revolution was 
made. Playing upon the predominant mood of the assembly, keynote 
speaker Alfredo Pujol declared that unless the government ad- 
dressed planters' demands they would resort to "'the red flag of 
revolution, supreme refuge of the oppressed." 
This is anomalous. The scene clashes with the usual 
portrayal of Paulista planters as being among the most economi- 
cally secure, organized and politically incorporated export elite 
in Latin American history. How then could they feel so oppressed 
as to threaten revolution? What are we to make of the self- 
declared economic difficulties, lack of organization, and decay 
in political influence? How shall we explain this unexpected 
display of. insecurity? 
At a general level, answers to these and related questions 
can help clarify the conditions under which economic elites and 
power holders mobilize to defend their interests. They are par- 
ticularly relevant in elucidating the political behavior of ex- 
port elites and emergent bourgeoisies in dependent societies-- 
and, from there, of the conditions under which they can exert 
dominance over the political process and over the development of 
a national society. In terms of the continuity of the larger 
process of capitalist development--of which export sector growth 
is the first major phase--this ability is especially pivotal 
when, as was the case in Brazil starting in the 19201s, the 
growth of the export economy begins to stabilize and established 
export elites face the challenge of new social groups advocating 
new forms of development, particularly industrialization. 
In this context of large-scale transition, most accounts of 
the political behavior of export elites have predicated an other- 
wise unproblematic hegemony on their part, only jolted into 
demise by factors outside the organization of the export sector 
proper. Many accounts of the revolutionary episodes of the 
1930's in Latin America and of the attendant ebbing in planter 
"oligarchical" control, for example, advanced explanations in 
terms of factors such as the saturation of world markets or the 
global crisis of 1929-30. Others concentrated on possible discon- 
tinuities between the export economy and the process of in- 
dustrialization: the demise of the planter and the dependent 
economy coming about when an industrial class and process of 
economic development were able to overthrow them. 
While defining the proper framework for an inquiry, it is 
clear that alterations in the external dimensions of dependence 
and broad patterns of potential conflict related to the issue of 
industrialization can hardly by themselves explain the socio- 
political organization of planters and their allies. This study 
attempts an alternative approach in terms of the internal social 
organization of the export sector. It assesses cleavages and ten- 
sions related to the processes of differentiation generated by 
the very development of the export sector in an effort to deter- 
mine the degree of cohesion among planters and cognate groups, 
including politicians. The limelight is on processes of differen- 
tiation and cleavage linked to the interplay between competing 
modes of production organization--what Hirschman(l977) has called 
"micro modes of production." For S%o Paulo, the analysis focuses 
on the interplay between the large fazenda and the emergence of a 
small holding system. 
The large coffee planters of S%o Paulo have been 
traditionally credited with bringing about modern capitalist 
relations in Brazil. They are accorded the most decisive struc- 
tural role in the transition to modern Brazilian society-- 
starting with the processes leading to the abolition of slavery 
in 1888 and the overthrow of the Empire in 1889. The federal 
republican system ensuing thereafter is said to have been so 
dominated by coffee elites that it has been dubbed "the Republic 
of Coffee." Coffee was indeed king in its importance for 
Brazilian society, often accounting for over 70% of exports and 
constituting the locus of accumulation for a great many of the 
Brazilian fortunes of this century. 
The term "hegemony" has. been used in the literature to 
characterize the hold'of Paulista planters over Brazilian society 
throughout this period(e.g., Fausto 1977). Politically, planter 
organization and domination is said to have been institutional- 
ized in the form of the land-based coffee-producing local politi- 
cal chief known as coronel. Through a pyramid of clientelistic 
relations in which higher level coronbis aggregated the demands 
and claims of their clienteles in the lower levels, the planter- 
coronel was said to have reigned supreme over state and national 
political structures until the very eve of the Revolution of 
1930. The roots of planter hegemony have been predicated on the 
- economic predominance grounded on the strength of the micro mode 
of production over which he presided, the fazenda Paulista. Un- 
like the plantation system based on slavery which emerged in 
prior waves of coffee expansion in Brazil and other parts of S3o 
Paulo, that of the so-called Santos zone(see Map, Appendix) came 
to rely almost wholly on free labor--immigrant European labor-- 
even before Abolition was declared in 1888. Free labor, provided 
in the form of the colonato, was the key element making it a 
modern capitalist institution in the eyes of some observers. 
Together with a third element of planter predominance, the large- 
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scale commercial intermediary known as comissario, the planter is 
said to have exercised a secure hold over the coffee export sec- 
tor and the overal-l economy unfolding around it until the very 
crisis of 1929-30. 
How to reconcile this view with that expressed by planters 
themselves in the mobilization campaigns of the early 1920's? 
A closer look at these demands suggests that planter 
problems ran much deeper than those provided by the vicissitudes 
of the external market or direct political pressure from in- 
dustrialists(See also Font 1982, forthcoming). Sure enough, 
government intervention in the market to protect the price of 
coffee was a recurring demand. But side by side with this claim, 
often even more prominently, were demands denoting serious inter- 
nal difficulties: 
( 1 )  A larger flow of immigrant colono labor to counter a 
major labor shortage. Labor shortages were said to have 
put the planter "at the mercy" of-the colono, with wage 
increases going out of control and threatening Sgo 
Paulo's competitive position. 
Change in the taxation system developed in S%o Paulo. 
The "ad valorem" export tax levied on coffee to fund the 
state budget, coupled with other indirect taxes and a 
special surtax levied in 1908 to finance the first 
valorization scheme, was said to rise production costs 
beyond acceptable levels. Resentment against the govern- 
ment on this count is summarized in the repeated charges 
that it was a "partner without capital." 
( 3 )  The creation of a Planters Bank and increased credit to 
finance coffee stocks. 
( 4 )  A Centro da Lavoura was called for to organize a divided 
class and restore planters' capacity to influence 
policy-making. 
In summary, if we take planters at face value important 
aspects of the internal organization of the export sector and its 
relation to the government were in major need of overhauling. 
Normal verbal jousting or durable claims? The position 
taken here is that planters should be taken seriously. The prin- 
cipal working hypothesis explored below is whether their cries 
against chronic undersupply of labor, loss of control of the com- 
mercial aspects of the coffee economy and over the policy-making 
processes reflected a generalized decay in the hegemonic role 
played by the fazenda in the earlier stages of the development of 
the Paulista export sector. 
To assess the extent to which these demands did indeed 
reflect durable concerns and the erosion of the predominance of 
the fazenda.requires an in-depth examination of the stability of 
the labor system, of the commercial networks tying producers to 
intermediaries and buyers, and of the terms of embedding of the 
export sector in the enveloping policy structures. The argument 
to be developed is that, by World War I--and then increasingly 
throughout the decade of the 1920's--important processes of dif- 
ferentiation were taking place within the coffee economy it- 
self. These were undermining the three pillars on which the 
predominance of the fazenda rested: to repeat, an abundant and 
pliable labor system under the colonato, strong commercial and 
financial intermediation in the person of the comissario, and in- 
strumental control of the policy-making processes under the 
clientelistic system of interest aggregation known as coronelis- 
mo . -
CHANGES - IN PRODUCTI0N:CHALLENGES -- TO THE FAZENDA 
The main arguments about the strength of the fazenda coffee 
economy have been based on its scale and the growth rhythm it 
generated. It is difficult not to share this view. In the short 
fifteen years between 1880 and 1895 the coffee economy grew six- 
fold and came to claim for the Santos zone--hitherto a largely 
unexplored or.unsettled region--first place in world production. 
At the end of. this boom Santos 10-million bag harvests 
represented half of the world's production. They typically ac- 
counted for close to 40% of Brazilian exports. Besides being the 
largest coffee export sector ever, it constituted one of the 
largest export sectors to its time. 
While indeed there can be no quibbles about the role of the 
I 
fazenda in the early phase of expansion, there are sufficient 
grounds to argue that in subsequent phases pressures on the 
fazenda led to the emergence of other forms of production, par- 
ticularly small. and medium holders. 
The best aggregate evidence pointing to the emergence of al- 
0 
ternative forms of production comes from data on the nationality 
of holders reported in various available censuses and surveys, 
especially those of 1905, 1920, 1923 and 1932. These data have 
been recently assessed in a study arguing that the emergence of a 
small holding system in SXo Paulo was related to the upward 
mobility of immigrant colonos(~oliowa~ 1974). The aggregate 
results from these sources are summarized in Table 1. 
These figures show that by 1905 foreigners were significant- 
ly represented among landowners in the Santos region with 22% of 
the total. By 1920 the figure jumps to approximately 40%, while 
somewhat larger percentages are obtained in the coffee tax survey 
of 1923(43%) and the agricultural census of 1932(48%). 
Holloway's line of analysis crystallizes a debate with 
authors such as Caio Prado ~unior ( 1933), ~a11( 1969)~ ean( 1977) 
and Souza ~artins(1979) who have denied. or minimized any sig- 
nificant move from colono to independent farming on the part of 
the immigrants. Earlier, several Paulista social analysts such 
as Milliet(l941) and ~amargo(1952) had noticed the emergence of 
small holders in coffee production(a1though their implicit dis- 
agreement with Caio Prado Junior was rather muted). The latest 
statement expressing the counter position(Souza Martins 1979) ar- 
gues that 'planters were able to monopolize control of land, par- 
ticularly the best ones, and thus inhibit independent small farm- 
ing by immigrant colonos. 
Most of the data adduced to deny significance to the rise of 
a small holding system from the ranks of the colonos pertains to 
the period before 1920, centering in particular on the census of 
1905. In that census, "onlyn(e.g. Souza Martins 1977) 8,392 rural 
properties appeared as belonging to foreigners in the state, of 
which 6,840 were in the Santos region. Now, if we multiply that 
figure by 4.6, the average size of colono families, the resulting 
figure of 40,000 individuals pursuing an independent livelihood 
in agriculture does not appear as low a figure. In all 
likelihood, the census figures underestimafe the number of small 
holders. As Dean(1977: 178) himself found, many sitiantes and 
Table 1 
BRAZILIAN AND FOREIGN FARMS IN SAO PAULO--Summary of 
Six Surveys and Censuses, 1905 to 1934. 
Includes only municipios in. the western plateau(see 
regionalization attempts by Camargo, Milliet and Holloway). 
Includes municipios in western plateau as well as in other 
regions. 
Source: S%o Pau10,Secretaria da ~gricultura(1904-05). 
Source: Brazil(1920). 
Source: S%o Paulo, Secretaria da ~gricultura(l924). 
Source: S%o Paulo, Secretaria da ~gricultura(l934). 
Source: S%o Paulo, Secretaria da ~gricultura(l934). 
Source: S%o Paulo, Secretaria da ~gricultura(l936). 
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properties or posses during this period. Apparently, most of 
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these did not register properties until the 1930's. Dean's es- 
timate of the true number of small holders in Rio Claro increased 
dramatically when he took this group into account. On the basis 
of the revised numbers, he concluded that up to 15% of the rural 
labor force may have owned land(See Dean 1976: 492). If this num- 
ber is extrapolated to the 300,000 or so workers in the Santos 
zone at the time(Hol1oway 1974:249), the resulting figure of 
45,000 is impressive. Assuming an average of three workers per 
family, this yields an estimate of 15,000 units. This is probably 
a high estimate. Together with the official census figure it 
provides a range within which the truth is to be found. 
The figure from the 1920 census is useful in portraying the 
relative increase with respect to the official 1905 figures. But 
it is also likely to be as much of an underestimate as that for 
1905.   he same can be said about the admittedly partial coffee 
tax survey of 1923--which, in any case, shows 41% of the coffee 
farms and 30% of coffee trees to be in the hands of foreig- 
ners. It should also be noted that in all censuses and surveys 
c af ter 1920, second generation immigrants appeared as 
Brazilian. Since the boom in immigration took place between 1885 
and the mid 18901s, children born before 1900 would be adults by 
1920 and many could be expected to have become small coffee 
growers. 
Washington ~uis's platform address during his campaign for 
President of the state of S3o Paulo in 1920 confirms the fact and 
the importance of the Paulista small holding system. His main 
theme was that a "silent" transformation was taking place in the 
state's land tenure system via the subdivision of the latifundios 
and the new patterns of settlement in the virgin areas of the 
west(See "0 Estado de S3o Paulo" 1/26/20: 4). 
'The nationality of the planters against whom rural-workers 
lodged complaints at the labor relations board known as Patronato 
~gricola throughout the 1920's--the period for which comparable 
data are available--provides yet a separate indica.tion of the 
degree-of participation of foreigners in coffee production after 
~ u i s  became president. As shown in Table 2, by 1924-25 native 
Brazilians accounted for less than 50% of the claims. This 
figure gives an estimate of close to 50% of immigrant and foreign 
share of coffee production respectively. 
TABLE 2 
NATIONALITY OF PLANTERS AGAINST WHOM CLAIMS WERE FILED AT 
THE PATRONATO AGRICOLA, 1922-1930(In percentages). 
ITALIAN 1 2o 22 18 30 25 19 21 20 24 
-- - - 
NATIONALITY 
BRAZILIAN 
OTHER 1 4 23 38 27 24 25 29 28 23 
1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
76 55 44 43 51 56 50 52 53 
TOTAL 1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
SOURCE: S%o Paulo, Secretaria da Agricul- 
tura(1920-1930).  ela at brio. (~nnual reports of the 
Patronato ~gricola). 
That a shift to small holding agriculture was taking place 
during this decade is also indicated by coffee tax records for 
the. county of Araraquara reconstructed by Edgar Carone and col- 
leagues(see Azzoni et. al. 1975). Three graphs, found in the Ap- 
pendix(Part -D), have been derived here from those data and offer 
a telling picture. The first graph registers a sharp increase in 
the number of small holders(from 350 in 1920 to. over 600 in the 
late- 1920'~)~ while the numbers of other types of producers 
remain stable. This increase was not brought about by the simple 
proliferation of ever smaller holdings. The second graph shows a 
gradual increase in the proportion of coffee trees accounted for 
by small holders, which is accompanied by a decrease in the 
proportion of trees in latifundia and large farms. Moreover, as 
shown in the third graph, there is a sharp decrease in the 
average size of latifundia, while the size of small holdings 
undergoes a modest increase from 7,500 trees ih 1920 to close to 
, . 
'7,900 trees at the end of the decade. 
An incomplete survey of coffee farms done in 1930 by the 
Coffee Institute of the State of S3o Paulo shows that 74% of 
39,897. farms surveyed had less than 20,000 trees--a size as good 
as any for an operational definition of small farm. Since the 
estimated 10% of the groves not surveyed were in the "very new" 
areas, where small holders concentrated, the figure of 29,429 
farms of less than 20,000 trees is almost certain to have an ad- 
ditional bias in favor of a lower estimate(see BICESP April 1931: 
1). The coffee survey of 1935-36 by the Secretaria da Agricul- 
tura revealed a total of 88,230 coffee farms in the state, of 
which 73,935--or 84%--were under 20,000 trees(DNC 1938: 240). It 
seems likely that such an abrupt change was caused in large part 
by the listing of properties previously unlisted, such as those 
discussed by Dean, as much as by the break-up of large estates 
taking place after the crisis of 1930. 
Factors - - - -  in the rise of small holding coffee farminq. The 
overwhelming majority of the 2.5 million immigrants entering S%o 
Paulo between 1884 and 1930 came as colonos for the coffee- fazen- 
das. An indication of the level of immigrant preponderance is -
that native Brazilians were responsible for only 18% of the 
claims filed with the Patronato ~gricola between 1920 and 
1928(see Font.1982, forthcoming). Based on the high association 
between immigration and the colonato, Holloway's argument is that 
colono mobility must have been the main avenue to independent 
small-scale coffee.farming. His argument is supported by diverse 
kinds of data--ranging from almanacs of localities, testimonials 
of the period, community case studies, ethnic groups studies-- 
repeating the t-heme of mobility by immigrant colonos. 
As Table 1 indicates, the growth of small holders was indeed 
a phenomenon decidedly related to the immigrants. Even ignoring 
the biases produced by unlisted sitiantes and naturalized or 
second generation owners, foreigners accounted for an impressive 
48% of the units. Yet, Holloway's argument is not as open and 
shut a case as it seems. 
An alternative hypothesis compatible with the observed cen- 
sus data is that those immigrants who became land owners and 
coffee producers did so with savings they brought from home or 
acquired in other economic activities in S%o Paulo--particularly 
in the booming intra-regional commerce. 
The first poss,ibility tends to be negated by research on the 
wealth of incoming immigrants as indicated by the number of items 
of luggage they brought. This shows that, averaging about half a 
bag per person(Hol1oway 1974: 378-791, the . European immigrants 
who came to SXo Paulo were rather impecunious as a group. On the 
other hand, ~ean(1971) argues that some of the immigrants were of 
bourgeois origins. But it is unlikely that these newcomers would 
have had the agricultural skills to become coffee growers soon 
after arrival. It should also be kept in mind that, while the im- 
mense majority of the immigrants may have been too destitute of 
capital and skills to become independent coffee farmers, a sig- 
nificant number--as will be discussed below--came as part of 
colonization schemes designed from the start to set them as in- 
dependent producers. 
The second alternative is even more plausible. There is 
evidence that urban-based economic activities on the part of im- 
migrants were booming in the towns and cities in the interior of 
the state prior to '1920. According to a 1910 survey of the tax- 
able value of urban properties reported by Holloway himself, im- 
migrants and other foreigners owned 43,930 buildings with a tax- 
able value of approximately ' $102,763,650 (see   able 3). The 
reported value of urban properties exceeded the value of rural 
properties declared by immigrants in the 1905 rural census. The 
value of foreign urban properties is more than twice the declared 
value of $44,313,218 for all foreign owned rural properties in 
all of the state and $40,525,440 in the Santos zone. That is, 
foreigners seem to have been doing better in the cities than in 
the countryside. Cities rather than fazendas appear as more like- 
ly places for the accumulation of savings and capital that could 
have gone into the formation of the immigrant sitios and fazen- 
das. The data from the surveys of 1905 and 1910 are reproduced in -
Table 3, which also shows the figures for the single most 
economically important immigrant group, the Italians. Since the 
comparable figure for Brazilians was not published, the relative 
weight of immigrants cannot be determined. Holloway(1974: 
401,515) estimates, however, that by 1905 immigrants owned up to 
48% of the buildings in the city of S3o Paulo, with Italians 
alone accounting for 25%. 
There is evidence indicating that urban-based commercial 
capital was seeking application in coffee lands. Dean( 1971 : 1781, 
for example, found that most of the larger foreign-owned land 
units in Rio Claro belonged to merchants or other urbanites from 
the city of Rio Claro or outside the county. 
Yet, there is one major a priori difficulty in attributing 
most immigrant farm ownership and operation to prior urban ex- 
periences. This notion contradicts the usual paths observed in 
patterns of mobility. It is difficult to envisage a large scale 
move back to the countryside on the part of successfully ur- 
banized immigrants. To set themselves up in independent urban oc- 
cupations, immigrants who lacked initial savings would have had 
to accumulate some savings in agric-ulture, presumably as colonos, 
and would have had the choice of continuing a career in agricul- 
ture or in urban occupations. Once "graduated" to an urban oc- 
cupation --small merchant or manufacturer, artisan or industrial 
proletarian, or the li,ke--there probably would have remained very 
Table 3 
Urban and Rural Properties Owned by Foreigners in 
Sqo Paulo, 1905 and 1910--in U.S. Dollars. 
Derived from Thomas H. Holloway Migration and 
Mobility: Immigrants ' as Laborers and LF -downers, Ph.D. ~issertation,~niversity of Wisconsin, 
1974, pp. 392-394 and 401-402. The data used by Hol- 
loway are ,from the tax on urban buildings(imposto 
redial) paid in 1 1 1  of SZo Paulo's 175 municipios in 
7910. The counties included fall in the coffee 
zone. The data appeared in "propieti urbane .appar- 
tenenti a stranieri nello Stato de S. Paolo," Italia 
e Brasile, Vol. 3, No.2(Nov.-Dec. 1910:. between 192 
En3733-E 
Nationality 
ALL FOREIGNERS . 
Number of Units 
Value . . . . . 
ITALIANS . . . . 
Number of Units 
Value . . . . . 
little propensity for him to return to direct agriculture. A 
similar argument can be made about those who came with savings or 
who achieved savings from commercial or industrial ac- 
tivities. What is more likely is that, when the property pur- 
chased was large enough, resident administrators or operators 
would have been hired or contracted; and, when it was a small 
sitio or minifundio, sharecroppers or renters would have been 
responsible for production. Again, Dean found 5% of the rural 
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labor force of Rio Claro to hold such arrangements with ur- 
banites. 
Even if it were to be established that urbanized immigrants 
accounted'directly or indirectly for most of the small and medium 
holdings, this would not necessarily contradict the hypothesis of 
colono mobility. On the contrary, to the extent that urbanized 
immigrants could be presumed to have come mainly from the fazen- 
das successful urban experiences could be construed as a -1 
separate channel of upward mobility and an indirect path from the 
colonato td independent farming. 
The colonato - and independent farming: context. Whatever may 
have been the precise path connecting the colonato, the emergence 
of an urban economy and independent farming, it is clear that 
they were all part of the same movement of the Paulista coffee- 
centered economy. 
Perhaps even before 1920, when census data shows S3o Paulo 
to have taken the lead in industrial production, the state may 
have been becoming more urbanized than the rest of Brazil. A 
regional market economy had- arisen, drawing various subregional 
hinterlands into an increasingly structured network of trade, 
with nodes in the towns springing up as the railroad lines 
penetrated. the interior. 
Since the. large fazenda tended to self-sufficiency(Dean 
1971), it was the small holder, and the colonosrising beyond the 
subsistence level, who must have provided a great deal of the in- 
itial impetus in demand and supply which primed and sustained the 
process. In this context, there are sound reasons to posit 
colono mobility as a primary starting point of the processes 
leading to the formation of a small holding system in SXo Paulo. 
Admittedly, it was the goal of independent farming what 
brought most immigrants to SXo Paulo(Hal1 1969). The term 
"colono" itself suggested an individual who came to colonize or 
settle the kind of open region much of SXo Paulo was at the time. 
The ambiguity of the term was no doubt used by Paulista elites to 
encourage this perception--and, with it, immigration. The struc- 
tural properties of the role, as will be seen below, encouraged 
-among colonos the illusion that they were or could be on the road 
to becoming independent producers(Souza Martins 1979: 92-93). 
Coffee work conditions in the fazenda--particularly up to 
the first decade of the twentieth century--were harsh and not 
conducive to massive upward mobility. Planters considered colonos 
mere substitutes for the slave; their initial treatment was not 
unlike that accorded the latter. In general; planters kept wages 
at low levels. Yet, while the goal of independent farming became 
a will-o-the-wispfor most immigrants, with at the very most 7-8% 
of potential landowners among first generation immigrants able to 
become independent producers(Ho11oway 1974: 434), the fact 
remains that a substantial number did so. The figure was suffi- 
ciently large to serve as visible example for others to emulate. 
Those colonos whom in Dean's study became small holders worked in 
the fazendas for about 12 years to raise the necessary 
savings. For the Japanese, the last major immigrant group in the 
period studied here, Tsukamoto(l973) reports 10 years as the time 
taken to the majority of those who made it, and 6 years for the 
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very successful families. These differences probably reflect the 
fact that Rio Claro at the time was a mature area of settlement, 
whereas the frontier to which the Japanese were attracted had 
cheaper fertile lands. These numbers pertain to those who made 
it. Most immigrants probably tried in vain many yea'rs, only to 
eventually join the growing ranks of the landless proletariat. Be 
that as it may, by 1934 up to one fourth of all foreign-born 
potential landowners may have in fact come to own rural proper- 
ty(Hol1oway 1974: 435). At that time; a higher proportion of im- 
migrants than comparable Brazilian natives owned land in S3o 
Paulo(Holloway 1974: 436). 
Since--from what is known--most of those who tried did not 
make it, the critical factor in any process of mobility was un- 
likely to be motivation, bu.t should be sought in the opportunity 
structure unfolding with the changes in the colonato resulting 
from the development of the Paulista economy. 
The evolution of the co1onato:from subsistence aqriculture - --
to commodity p - roduction. To-assess the collective capacity for 
colono upward mobility requires an analysis of the evolution of 
the colonato--and thus of the fazenda. 
Developed in the context of the transition from slave to 
free labor, the colonato was likewise intended to generate a 
L 
stable resident labor force. While a free laborer, the colono 
was not a full proletarian. The standard colono contract 
provided for a package of wage and other incentives. Three major 
forms of remuneration were specified--money wages for the 
care(trat0) of coffee groves, for the harvesting of the 
beans(colheita), and for unspecified daily work(diaria1. In addi- 
tion, it provided free housing as well as usufruct of land for 
subsistence crops. All wages were on a per unit basis--a fixed. 
amount of money per thousand trees cared, per unit of volume of 
coffee picked, or per day worked. In the usual contract(e.g., 
see Bassanezi: ~ppendix), all services performed were 
remunerated, except for a few days per year(up to six in the 
fazenda Santa Gertrudes studied by Bassanezi and Dean) for main- 
tenance or repair of the road connecting the fazenda to the 
nearest loading facility(usual1y a railroad service station). 
Also specified were a variety of fines the administration could 
levy on colonos who violated work rules and procedures. 
Several authors have recently noted the peculiar combination 
of capitalist and non-capitalist relations of production in the 
colonato through which planters derived income in the form of 
surplus-value as well as a form of land'tribute. Jose de '~ouza 
~artins(l977) identified this situation. Later, Sallum (1979) 
demonstrated that this arrangement entailed what can be seen as 
the payment of non-capitalist rent to the planter. Relying on an 
exegesis of Marx's analysis of rent(Capita1,III) he argued that 
the difference between what the colono received and the value of 
his labor was rent paid. Colonos and planters were thus related 
in a capitalist(wage1 and precapitalist(rent1 
relationship. Planters were, both and at the same time, 
capitalist producers and landlords. Colonos in turn were wage 
earners and subsistence tenants. For planters, rent income was 
what he would have had to pay in additional real wages to main- 
tain his.labor force. That is, rent "income" can be seen as 
market wage for all labor performed less money wage paid. 
The hypothesis is advanced here that this arrangement made 
it possible for some of the colonos to become independent com- 
modity producers, thus providing a base for a potential shift to 
coffee production. 
The main logic of the system was to put in the own hands of 
the colono the responsibility to provide for his own subsistence, 
i.e. for the reproduction of the work force. Economic pressures 
on planters were thus thereby minimized, particularly when coffee 
price slumps reduced their revenues. Then, the standard reaction, 
constrained by the availability of land, was to increase land use 
privileges while reducing wages--that is,to increase the "rent" 
component of his "income." 
As a result, usufruct.rights were becoming more central to 
the colono than any other'item. Besides providing for his sub- 
sistence, the- colono also produced food surpluses which, in the 
expanding Paulista economy, were additional sources of cash in- 
come. 
Perhaps more important than price slumps in the extension of 
planting rights to colonos was the competition for labor among 
planters. Rather than increasing the wage bill, the preferred 
strategy of planters was, again, to attract colonos by offering 
increased land privileges. Competition for immigrant labor be- 
came a major source of friction among planters. The immense 
majority of claims filed by planters against other planters at 
the Patronato ~gricola during the 1920's were for "wooing" of 
colonos or aliciamento(55%) and for failure to pay old debts of 
the colonos they hired(42%)(see Appendix). Bassanezi(l973: 
110-111) reports planters in Rio Claro to have been at a 
veritable cold war(querra fria) over this question. 
Incidentally, it is no doubt in part due to the role of land 
in attracting labor that the Paulista coffee economy expanded so 
fast. The success of the fazenda in drawing sufficient manpower 
was directly dependent on making land available for colono use as 
well as for coffee groves. The expanding frontier to the west had 
plenty of land for both uses. A concomitant outcome from this was 
the tendency for coffee production to expand incessantly. This 
was also particularly the case because the conditions permitting 
planters to offer the best contracts to colonos were those to 
"form" new groves (contrato de formaq%o). In the 4-6 years it 
took a coffee seedling to become a producing tree, the 12 feet or 
so separating the rows planted with coffee could be used to plant 
corn or beans--together with rice, the three main staples in the 
colono's diet. This pressure was so significant that the coffee 
economy--instead of stimulating technological innovation td in- 
tensify production--continued to grow extensively into the fron- 
tier even in the years of depressed coffee prices between 1897 
and 1910. 
What is important for present purposes is that colonos could 
become significant land operators on their own --gaining skills 
as farmers of subtropical crops and even coffee. At least some 
of them --but particularly formadores, who had control of land 
and coffee harvests for 4-7 years--can be said to hdve been ap- 
proximating generalized petty commodity production(see also Faus- 
to 1977: 199). They worked in semi-autonomous fashion, purchasing 
basic means of production, such as hoes, peneiras, and all 
household items. The family, and not the colono by himself, was 
the central unit of production. Family resources were pooled in 
pursuit of economic objectives and a division of labor instituted 
which exploited the labor power of all family members 10 years or 
older. Rather than staying in the house, the wife usually spent 
a great deal of her time working in the cafezal or caring for the 
family plantings in their rota. Family composition may have been 
one of the single most important factors in elevating a minority 
of colono families beyond common proletarianization. It seems 
that unless the family unit could count on several able 
hands(they were called "braqos") to care for a large roqa and a 
higher number of coffee trees, proletarianization was 
unavoidable. 
If the subsistence economy inherent in the colonato(0liveira 
-1977 :397-398) had the potential of becoming a generalized form 
of petty commodity production, that potential hinged ultimately 
on the structural variables affecting the scale of,production and 
the demand for the surpluses of beans, rice and corn produced in 
the family ro~a--that is, on the "use value" of the land for 
which "rent" was paid to the landowner-planter. As will be ar- 
gued below, these were to make a big difference. In an immediate 
sense, expansion of. petty commodity production depended on con- 
tinuing and expanded access to land. This, in turn, depended on a 
variety of factors affecting the labor market. 
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Land availability, labor market conditions -- and the expansion 
of petty commodity production. The use of land as a short-run -
safety valve in the fazenda may have become its main problem in 
the long run. Planters with unused good land, like those in the 
frontier regions, were at a considerable advantage in attracting 
colonos from established regions and fazendas. Abundant young 
groves there permitted more of the kind of interrow cropping 
highly sought by the colono. With the same amount of work, he 
could-weed and care for the coffee trees under him as well as his 
own plantings of beans, corn and even rice. Bad treatment, ex- 
hausted or unavailable land contributed additional "push" effects 
from older areas. Added to the high attrition rates generated by 
urban migration, repatriation, and a shift to small holding 
agriculture, these push and pull effects came to be responsible 
for the high turnover rate, "nomadism" and labor market condi- 
tions recognized as basic to colono upward mobility. In one of 
the best studies on the subject, ~assanezi(l975) found that half 
of the colonos and other workers in the same fazenda Santa 
Gertrudes of Rio Claro. studied by Dean stayed. less than 4.1 years 
working there during the period '1895-1930. 
This geographic mobility prevented the full in- 
stitutionalization of relations of dependence, contributed fur- 
ther to making the labor market a dynamic one, and put the colono 
in direct contact with the full range of opportunities available. 
Generally, colono nomadism and search for El Dorado to the West 
may have favored a secular improvement in the overall terms of 
the contracts(see also Ramos 1923: 195-226). 
What is important is that, instead of tending to equilibrium 
by the reproduction of a pliant and stable labor force, fazendas 
were unable to retain and confirm incoming cohorts of immigrants 
as permanent resident colonos. In fazenda Santa Gertrudes, 35 
out of the required 135 colono families had to be replaced each 
year due to departures. If we take these figures as representa- 
tive, one fourth of the fazenda permanent labor force in the 
state had to be replaced ever) year. 
While a substantial number of colonos undertook the road of 
geographic mobility in the search for a better life, very few 
, 
remained committed to the colonato as a way of life. Even then 
they continued to harbor illusions of the colonato as a tran- 
sitory station en route to either independent farming or an urban 
occupation. 
On a typical year the fazendas lost dozens of thousands of 
.colones to these two alternatives and to a third option activated 
when disillusionment was unavoidable, repatriation to the home 
country. Of the two and a half million immigrants entering S3o 
Paulo between 1887 and 1930, perhaps as many as 70% seem to have 
returned to Europe (can0 1977: 48,621. 
This way, the colono system which came to prevail in the in- 
terior of S3o Paulo should be seen as a revolving-door labor sys- 
tem based on continuous international migration. Several 
thousand new immigrant families were needed each year to 
replenish the fazendas for those lost to cities, independent 
agriculture and repatriation. 
With the high attrition rates and the tendency or expansion, 
the coffee economy put unremitting pressures on the state's im- 
migration program. At first the government readily complied. Hol- 
loway has estimated that immigration exceeded the overall demands 
of the coffee economy up to the first part of the twentieth cen- 
tury. He argues that by the 1890's there had entered many more 
immigrants than needed by the coffee fazendas(l974: 149,252). Had 
it not been for the concomitant development of industry, he sur- 
mises that there would have been massive rural unemployment when 
the crisis. deepened later in the decade(1974: Table 5-21: 256). 
But, this situation did not last long. Soon the immigration flow 
and labor pool were to be be drastically reduced and a period of 
chronic shortages to begin. 
The institutionalization of the colonato. So long as - - -
planters were able to count on yearly inflows of subsidized im- 
migration and were able to exercise control over the lands, they 
managed to have enough labor, pay relatively low money wages, and 
make a hefty profit. Again, failure to sustain a sufficiently 
large flow of fresh colonos had a direct an immediate impact in 
forcing concession of land in better terms(Dean 1977: 185) and 
perhaps even higher money wages. Tied to simple commodity 
production and not mature surplus value extraction, they were not 
oriented to increase the productivity of labor by increasing the 
organic composition of capital--and with it the technological 
component of production. 
The colono system encountered a fateful challenge when the 
coffee price crisis at the turn of the century led to such 
deterioration in economic conditions that immigrants began to - 
return home en masse. For several years the negative net flow of 
immigrants meant the loss of several hundred thousand-. potential 
workers (Halloway 1974 ,Can0 1977). Yet, coffee continued its ex- 
pansion to the west in spite of the general crisis and loss of 
labor. While they were pressured to lower money wages, planters 
were more inclined to expand interrow cropping to retain or at- 
tract colonos from a dwindling pool(~ol1oway 1974: 272-274). Ex- 
pansion continued even when a tax on the planting of new coffee 
trees was imposed in 1903 to prevent(unsuccessfu11y) a crisis of 
overproduction. At this juncture planters realized that they were 
inexorably tied to a continuous flow of immigration and that, 
lest immigration flows drop to critical levels, S3o Paulo had to 
offer prospective immigrants more than the mere semblance of 
reasonably good treatment. 
Before and during the time that some planters coped with the 
crisis or simply expanded by making more land available., the 
general tendency among a great many planters had been to reduce 
money wages. This affected in particular the colono families 
which, because of family composition or other related factors, 
relied more on wage income than on the sales of agricultural 
surpluses. In response to accounts of deterioration of working 
conditions in the fazendas, the Italian government passed the 
Prinetti decree in 1903 prohibiting subsidized migration to 
Brazil. The Spanish government threatened to follow suit. While 
many immigrants continued to leave, the inflow was sharply 
reduced. The main result was that, in the midst of the coffee 
price crisis lasting until 1910, planters had to face an adverse 
labor market, and were thus pressured to take compensatory 
measures. This explains that Dennis would find labor conditions 
in 1908 to be favorable to colonos in the Alta Mogiana region. 
Dean's Rio Claro was no exception to these changes. In Fazenda 
Santa Gertrudes--owned by Conde Eduardo Prates--colon0 contracts 
changed several .times between 1904 and 1927, always increasing 
the "concessions" of land use to colonos(see Bassanezi 1973: 
179). 
From this point on an abundant labor supply would be a 
chimera leading planters to make continuous demands for more im- 
migration to the state government. Just before 1920 they were 
asking for permanent program of subsidized immigration funded 
with 15% of the state's budget. It was clear at the time that 
such a program was needed because of the fazenda's failure to 
retain existing colonos(e.g., Holloway 1974: 218). Incidentally, 
the government resisted or deflected these pressures, maintaining 
its own immigration and colonization policies. In 1927 it 
eliminated altogether the program of subsidized immigration. 
Realizing how vulnerable the colonato was and how dependent 
they were on immigration, in 1909 planters agreed to a series of 
legal measures designed to protect the colono. The most important 
was the creation of a labor relations board, the Patronato 
~gricola, to mediate colono-planter grievances and to enforce new 
guidelines in the adoption of contracts-- to be spelled out in 
legalized documents called cadernetas. In 1906 the new Agencia 
Official de Colonizaq30 e Trabalho(Officia1 Agency of Coloniza- 
tion and ~aborl--the precursor of the state's Department of 
Labor--further facilitated the formation of a more dynamic market 
in labor. From that point on, the Hospedaria de Imigrantes 
operated as a market place as well as a lodging station. Competi- 
tive bidding came to allocate incoming workers among alternative 
potential employers, with the Agencia supplying information on 
jobs available, wages, other conditions, etc. The main intention 
of the Paulista coffee elite was to change the perception of 
fazenda conditions in Europe and thus be able to attract a large 
quantity of fresh immigration. 
Immigration resumed at higher levels, permitting the gradual 
expansion observed after 1911 under better coffee price condi- 
tions. However, World War I interrupted again the process of 
replenishing the labor pool(see e.g. Bassanezi 1973: 145). The 
relative imbalance between labor needs and supply continued to 
.accumulate as disruptions in international commerce and transpor- 
tation led to decreases in immigration larger than the drop in 
coffee prices and exports--whi'le the rural labor force was fur- 
ther depleted by leakages to new processes of urbanization and 
industrialization. It was this situation what triggered planters' 
charges in 1920-21 that 30-35% of the coffee groves were 
"decolonized." 
From -the colonato to independent farming: food croppinq and - - -
the generalization of' commodity production. If a drastic im- 
p -
balance did not take place until World War I, how could colonos 
have saved enough to have achieved the substantial mobility 
reporter earlier? It is also hypothesized here that the main 
factor triggering and sustaining colonos' savings and capacity to 
become independent holders was precisely the expansion in the 
demand for the food crops he produced in the "rented" plots--and 
thus in the value of his "subsistence" production. 
Stricto sensu, this process took place outside the realm of 
coffee production. Stimulated by the increased demand from fast- 
growing towns and cities and other Brazilian regions, the produc- 
tion of the three basic staples of subsistence agriculture--rice, 
beans and corn--grew so fast that by World War I S3o Paulo had 
become se.lf-sufficient and a net exporter of these three staples. 
TABLE 5 
AVERAGE YEARLY PRODUCTION OF KEY FOOD CROPS 
IN SAO PAULO( in 1,000 tons). 
PER1 OD I RICE BEANS CORN 
SOURCE: Adapted from Cano(1977: 62). 
The growth was truly formidable, since as late as the 1900's 
S3o Paulo imported huge amounts of food staples--accounting in 
' 1901-1905 for 26.4% of Brazilian imports of rice, 9.5% of beans 
and 9% of corn(Cano 1977:Table 5,p. 59). "Subsistence" 
producers--colones and independent small holders to whom the 
large fazenda had relegated these tasks--were not only feeding 
the coffee labor force of more than 200,000 families(at 4.8 in- 
dividuals per family), and the several million persons in the 
cities and towns burgeoning in the interior of the fastest grow- 
ing Brazilian state, but also produced a substantial surplus for 
export. Compared to the figures for.1901-1906, the five year 
averages for 1925-1930 shows an increase of 3.31 times in the 
production of beans, 6.89 in rice and 2.15 in corn(derived from 
Cano 1977: 64). Meanwhile, the population of the state doubled 
during this period. By the end of the decade of the ,1920's S3o 
Paulo occupied first place among Brazilian states in the produc- 
tion and export of all three items--with a production of 
1,650,000 tons of corn, 420,413 tons of rice and 196,800 tons of 
This was no longer subsistence agriculture. The renter- 
operator identified by Sallum and Souza Martins--"pre-capitalist" 
or not in his inception or structural relation to the mode of 
production represented by the fazenda--was now producidg cash 
crops for a mass market. What had happened was that, just as the 
planter had relied on rent to keep money payments down, so had 
the colono come to rely on the roqa under his operational control 
for most of his income(See also Cano 1977: 60-62). Hol- 
loway(1974: 101-104) discusses four different analyses of colono 
budgets at the turn of the decade from which it can be determined 
that colono income from the sale of products from the roqa al- 
ready accounted then for 22%, 36%, 37%, and 40% of all money in- 
come(See Dean 1976: 490 for less optimistic estimates). Since 
housing, pasture rights and the subsistence of the colono family 
itself were not included in these analyses, the real value of 
land use rights must have been substantially greater, perhaps 
more than half of the colono's total real income(Ho11oway 1974: 
97). 
Demand and prices for food staples were more stable than the 
price of coffee and made this reliance on the plot a rational 
strategy on the part of the colono. By the early 1920's the 
revenues he typically obtained from planting rights were equal to 
or higher than the income obtained from money wages. This was 
particularly the case in recently opened regions(Hol1oway 1974: 
285). What had made land operation particularly lucrative was 
that, due to planter's reliance on land as source of rent, the 
use value of land rented was increasing faster than 'the general 
level of land prices--in response to the rising demand for food 
from the cities. To repeat, land prices remained relatively low 
since they were largely determined by a coffee market which had 
remained more or less depressed'from 1897 to 1910 and the land 
was being used suboptimally by planters. 
Through 1929-30, immigration never caught up with the 
re,lentless demand for fresh labor for the fazendas. The available 
evidence from the decade of 1920 shows that, as a result, money 
wages themselves skyrocketed(see ~ppendixl--although much,perhaps 
all, of this increase was actually offset by inflation. While 
planters continued to cry out for immigration, colonos and ex- 
colonos faced unusually favorable labor conditions in addition to 
the rising demand for food. Planters had no choice but to main- 
tain or expand land use rights. Those who were ready to take ad- 
vantage of the situation could aspire to make the move to, in- 
dependent farming. The typical cost of a family sized plot of 
15-20 alqueires(40 hectares or so) was 6,000 r6is in a developed 
area such as Rio Claro(Dean-1976: 491) and cheaper at the fron- 
tier, and a growing number of colonos were now able to raise this 
fund in less than the 10-12 years it took earlier in the century. 
Land markets, colonization policies and small holding coffee - -
production. Colono savings could not lead to investment in direct 
coffee production unless the would-be producer had reliable ac- 
cess to suitable land(especial1y the roxa and massap6 soils). As 
we shall see, that required the effective penetration of the 
market into the realm of land allocation. Demand by colonos and 
ex-colonos with enough savings was a powerful pressure. But, for 
this pressure to become reality, land use control traditionally 
exercised by the planter-coronel would need to be neutralized. 
The land tenure system which had historically evolved in SZo 
Paulo was based on de facto occupation, recognized juridically as 
the principle of posse, rather than on transactions involving 
clearly validated titles(Sallum, Foweraker 1974). Control or 
ownership of land had come to be decided locally by the planter. 
This had inhibited the formation of a state-wide title registry. 
This was truly the heyday of the land-based coffee coronel. 
Through his ability to enforce rulings of local registries, and 
the relevant judicial apparatus he also controlled, the planter- 
coronel could effectively determine the uses to which land was 
put in his jurisdiction. So long as the planter could keep the 
market at bay in regards to the use of public lands and those 
claimed through the posse principle, he could brush off any 
pretension of aspiring colonos and ex-colonos to plant coffee on 
a significant scale. Any other mechanism of land allocation 
could only come about by a countervailing force. The penetration 
of the market into land use was to require a political process. 
As late as 1907 more than half of the lands in the state 
remained unoccupied and unsettled(See Map 1, Appendix). Accord- 
ing to the 1905 census, 5,014,000 of the state's 10,216,500 
alqueires were claimed as private property. While 50% of the 
available land was thus claimed, only 3% was cultivated. The 
areas of the "Old Westtt--the core of the Central, Mogiana and 
Paulista regions --accounted for most of the claimed and used 
land. These were areas developed with the boom of the 1880's and 
1890's. Most of the properties there were based on legalized 
titles derived from subdivisions of the sesmarias or massive land 
grants given by the Crown prior to 1822. The rest of the state-- 
the "new" West' of what later would be called the Araraquarense, 
Noroeste, Alta Paulista and Alta Sorocabana regions--was largely 
made up of terras devolutas or public lands, the disposition of 
which belonged in principle with the state. 
Planters had been able to ignore or resist various attempts 
made by the provincial or federal governments since 1850 to take 
effective control of the terras devolutas and assert primacy over 
the use of these lands(Hol1oway , Sallum). These efforts had 
taken the form of agronomic and cadastral efforts to survey and 
"discr'iminate" public lands. The effective registration and 
recognition of posses and other claims were a sine qua non for 
the development of a market in land sufficiently widespread to 
benefit small holders. Starting with the Lei da Terra of 1850 
the attempts made by the state only succeeded in legitimizing 
previous de facto occupations(Souza Martins 1977, Sallum 1979, 
Dean 1976). Land use continued to be subject to the rule of local 
powerful landlords up to the late 1910's. That these efforts had 
come to naught in the face of resistance and lack of collabora- 
tion on the part of local power holders did not mean that some of 
the most prominent state politicians were willing to let things 
be as .they were. Representing the' rising dominant sentiment 
within the ruling Part ido ~e~ublicano Paulista, important figures 
such as Cincinato Braga(1924: 1 1 1 )  called for a homestead act 
similar to the American. In this Braga was echoing the policy 
stand sketched in Washington ~ u i s '  1920 Platform, whose main 
principle was that the state government would thenceforth promote 
the subdivision of terras devolutas and latifundia to benefit 
small holding settlements. 
Planter capacity to resist the penetration of the state and 
the market decreased with the opening of the frontier taking 
place after 1910. .After the gradual rise in prices and produc- 
tion starting in 1910 was interrupted by the war in 1914, the 
cessation of hostilities and the freeze(geada1 of 1918 led to a 
recuperation in prices, immigration levels and expansion. The 
coffee valorization programs adopted after ,1921 reinforced these 
trends. Comparing Map 2 and Map l(see Appendix), it can be seen 
how dramatic the geographic expansion of land was in the thirteen 
years between 1909 and 1922. The growth starting after 1910 and 
running through the 1920's represented a boom in the so-called 
"new" regions--where the fertility of the virgin soil and new 
forms of' land tenure made possible significant reductions in 
production costs(Simonsen 1940: 73). As more than 60% of the har- 
vest came to be produced in the recently opened areas of the 
Araraquarense, Noroeste, Alta Mogiana, Alta Sorocabana and what 
later was to be the Alta Paulista(see Appendix), many fazendas in 
the older regions faced severe labor shortages and tough competi- 
tion: In a majority of the counties springing in the new west 
small holders came to account for more than 30% of the produc- 
tion. In 51 of the 126 municipios in the Santos zone surveyed in 
1923, fbreigners owned 50% or more of the farms, in 32 counties 
the figur'e was 60% and in 1 1  it was 70%. In four counties-- 
Taquaritinga, Rio das Pedras, Conchas and Barra Bonita--immigrant 
small holders accounted for more than 80% of the holdings and 
-coffee production(see Holloway 1974: 411,515). 
While unable to do so in the established coffee counties, 
the state bureaucracy--rather than local planters--could exercise 
considerable control over land use in the expanding frontier 
where small holders thrived. One way in which the state exercised 
a beneficial influence was through its ability to directly con- 
trol the administrative structures in the new counties, and favor 
emerging interests tied to land development and a more diver- 
sified economy. The opening of these lands was taking place when 
the state bureaucracy was peaking in its institutional develop- 
ment and ability to play a more active role vis-a-vis civil 
society( Font 1982, forthcoming). 
The second was via the organization, chartering or regula- 
tion of the large scale set.tlement and colonization projects 
catering to the growing mass of aspiring land holders. 
The provincial and state administrations had experimented in 
direct programs of immigrant colonization and settlement through 
the colonial nuclei(nbc1eos coloniaes) and "nurseryW(viveiro) 
programs. Originally requested by planters themselves to promote 
settlements near their fazendas, they were disappointed when the 
small holders in these colonies became so successful in private 
farming that they ignored job offers in the fazendas, preferring 
to use the time tending their own plots. Moreover, while meant to 
concentrate on the production of food crops and animals, 
"colonos" (note: the same term was used) in the nbcleos actually 
began growing coffee commercially. When the new period of expan- 
sion and immigration began after 1909, planters opposed the con- 
tinuation of these programs. One of the arguments wai that these 
programs were attracting colonos away from the fazendas. The 
fight was led by Paulo de Moraes Barros when named Secretary of 
Agriculture in 1913. By the early 1920's the state administration 
had decided to "emancipateW(give clear titles and withdraw state 
presence) all of the remaining nbcleos and to discontinue the 
program. 
A foremost consideration in this decision by the government 
may have been that less expensive and politically difficult ways 
were now available to implement its own colonization objec- 
tives. Private entrepreneurial efforts in land "speculation"; 
with charters or support from the state government, had begun a 
massive operation of claiming control of huge tracts of land, 
subdividing them into plots with "cleared" titles and selling 
them to buyers, notably the mass of aspiring small holders(see 
e.g. Schurig Vieira 1973 or Santos Abreu 1972). These large- 
scale development schemes were the key means whereby a market in 
land developed in the new West. 
A prototype of this model of colonization was that of the 
Companhia Marcondes de ColonizaqSo in the comarca of Presidente 
Prudente occupying the southwest corner of the state(see Santos 
Abreu 1972). This subregion--bordering on the rivers Peixe at the 
north, the paran6 at the west, and t.he Paranapanema at the south 
was largely an unsettled £orest until 1920, when the expansion of 
the Sorocabana railroad from the town of Assis in the east put it 
in direct contact with Santos. Then, the Companhia Marcondes 
moved to, consolidate huge tracts of land for subdivision into 
small plots and hundreds of would-be farmers flocked the 
area. The territories in question had been appropriated through 
posse, grilo, or purchase--more than 50,000 alqueires(or 121,000 
hectares). The compan'y organized private armies of capangas to 
enforce the occupation of the land against other claimants .and 
provided basic infrastructural services--administration, title 
clearing, road and town construction, etc. The companhia had 
links with the,government. Cel. Marcondes himself had active af- 
filiation in the ruling PRP, later becoming mayor of Presidente 
Prudente, while Custodio Coelho, an ex-President of the Bank of 
Brasil, was in the board of directors. The scale of operation 
was so large that at one point Marcondes himself went to Italy to 
meet with Mussolini to discuss a large program of immigration and 
colonization. According to ~antos Abreu there were at least ten 
other large land development corporations operating at the time 
in the Alta Sorocabana region--companies with such names as Com- 
panhia ViaqZo S3o Paulo-Mato Grosso, Empresa Jose Giorgi, Compan- 
hia Brasileira de ViaqZo e ~om6rci0, ColonizaqZo Martins, Cornpan- 
hia de Terras Norte do ParanA, and the like. 
A market for land was forged in the new west largely through 
these organized entrepreneurial schemes supported by the state. 
The land development scheme of the Marcondes company specialized 
in selling plots of "2,3,5,10 ... 20" alqueir.es to small 
holders. Payment could be made in installments. Buyers were most- 
ly colonos and ex-colonos from the older regions to the east who 
were hoping to "make it bigw in coffee. Since coffee took 4-6 
years to yield significant crops, the settlers survived and paid 
the installments with the production. and sale of food crops. Many 
were so successful that the scale of production went beyond the 
family unity and came to involve sharecroppers and formadores. 
In 1929, the series - -  0 Cafh(1929: 151) reported 679 tax-paying 
coffee producers in the municipio, with only 2 owning mor'e than 
100,000 trees and.13 more than 50,000. 
As Table 4 shows, within less than ten years of active 
colonization the area was exporting large quantities of corn, 
beans and rice--as well as coffee--through the Sorocabana rail- 
way. 
This type of colonization scheme induced or supported by the 
. TABLE 4 
MAIN EXPORTS FROM THE MUNICIPIO OF PRESIDENTE PRUDENTE, 1930 
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( I )  SOURCE: Santos ~breu(1972: 161). Except for coffee, 
figures refer to large bags of unspecified capacity. 
( 2 )  SOURCE: Santos Abreu(l972: 125). An alqueire equals 2.42 
hectares. 
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state was also used with foreign colonization companies. The 
73,407 20,451 
British-owned SZo Paulo Land, Lumber and Colonization Corporation , 
subdivided into small plots at least 50,000 alqueires in the 
~oroeste(in what later became the municipio of Birigui). By 1927 
the company had sold 48,253 alqueires in the form of 2,300 sitios 
or small holdings at prices reported to be three or four times 
those at which the land had been purchased(see Muller Camps 
1927)( Actually, the sale gains were considerably lower due to 
inflation). The' Japanese immigration in particular, which began 
in 1908 and intensified in 1917 and 1922-23, was channeled large- 
ly by semi-official colonization companies. The most sophisti- 
cated was the Kaigai Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha or K.K.K.K.(Overseas 
Development Company)(Schurig Vieira 1973: 35-47 1. The 
K.K.K.K. and other companies which preceded it bought land from 
the state or charted developers, settling in it thousands of im- 
migrants as independent or semi-independent operators in clusters 
of private plots or "colonies." 
More generally, the state also benefitted small holding 
agriculture by adopting transportation policies conducive to the 
development of the new areas. Because of the funnel-like lay out 
of the railroad network, strategically located lines such as the 
Paulista and Mogiana were not only able to account for most of 
the production but could protect their areas in the transporta- 
tion system whose ultimate destination was Santos. With the take 
over of the stagnant Northern railway in 1918, the state opened 
the rich area that came to be called Araraquarense, modernizing 
the company and literally forcing the Paulista and the S80 Paulo 
railway t.o transport the coffee and other products from the 
area. The state obtained a similar result with a comparable take 
over, modernization and extension of the Sorocabana line in the 
1 
1920's--favoring new areas to the west, such as Presidente 
Prudente. Yet another policy favoring commercial access of the 
previously farthest areas was the massive program of road con- 
struction implemented by the administration of Washington ~ u i s  
starting in 1920. 
As stated earlier, another significant land development 
scheme leading to the proliferation of "cleared" titles and thus 
the expansion of a market in land involved the planters them- 
selves. There were several different reasons leading some 
planters to "retalhamento"(subdivision). The first was a private 
effort, parallel to that of the government,. to provide for set- 
tlements.near fazendas which would supply the manpower needed 
during the harvest season. Planter Carlos ~eoncio de Magalhaes, 
for example, arranged for private nbcleos in his Cambuhy estates 
at the foot of the Araraquarense line. Coupled to the need for 
labor, planters in regions where the soil.was becoming relatively 
exhausted attempted to promote permanent nearby settlements, thus 
also making a profit in land of little value to them. This mix of 
motivations seems to have been present, for example, in the deci- 
sions of the Silva Prado clan to sell plots in their immense es- 
tates. 
But, by and large the avalanche on the land by the new 
colonization schemes represented a direct challenge to the es- 
tablished local planter chieftains. Their traditional land use 
prerogatives were now frontally threatened and new patterns of 
land tenure were' emerging. 
Land values began to soar under the joint pressure of coffee 
and general agricultural expansion. Pari passu, the market af- 
firmed itself as the principal mechanism for alienating land. 
As a land market began to grow, individual planters and 
other entrepreneurs also entered the industry of real es- 
tate. Prominent among these was the figure of the omnipresent 
grileiro, an expert in jumping claims by a combination of sheer 
force provided by capanqas and jagun~os(private armed agents) and 
preferential access to the local land title registries and 
magistrates. 
The policies adopted with respect to the important question 
of land use, immigration and colonization reinforced the develop- 
ment of new areas and the emergence of alternative land tenure 
systems in the expanding Paulista economy. These were often car- 
ried out against the expressed wishes of at least some locally 
established fazendeiros(see e.g. the reaction of the Goularts of 
Presidente Prudente to the penetration represented by the 
Cia. Marcondes). Again, the Japanese immigrati'on is another case 
in point. Even after many planters complained that the existing 
program was facilitating Japanese ability to operate land through 
renting, sharecropping or outright ownership--rather than 
stimulating him to remain a colono--the government continued to 
support the type of colonization wanted by the immigrant(N0gueira 
1973: 226, Cano 1977: 62). 
While proclaiming to be thus meeting the needs of the large 
fazenda, the state's immigration program came to encompass a 
broader colonization policy. The challenges to local landlords 
came to generate a series of confrontations which typically 
pitted them or their agents against land developers and as- 
sociated land buyers and political allies. 
Let's summarize the results of the analysis up to this 
point. The discussion has centered on several factors interact- 
ing with the colonato and resulting in making it possible for im- 
migrants, who entered the state as substitutes for slaves, to be- 
come independent small holders. A fluid labor market and oppor- 
tunity structure prevented the institutionalization of the 
colonato as a labor system based on permanent labor, made it pos- 
sible for immigrants to search for the best opportunities within 
or outside the fazenda system, and made planters dependent on 
continuous flows of fresh immigrant .labor. Unwilling or unable . 
to rely on money wages for all or most of his labor costs, the 
planter came to use land--acquired at little or no cost from the 
vast reserves of unexploited public lands--in the incentive pack- 
ages offered to colonos. This way, the latter came to function 
as producers of food staples as well as proletarians. The in- 
tended purpose of land usufruct was to make the colono respon- 
sible for his own subsistence and reproduction. However, the' 
dramatic expansion in demand for food crops made it possible for 
families with sufficient labor power to achieve substantial 
savings by orienting the usufruct of plots to the production of 
cash crops. The broader economy born of the coffee export sector 
developed . a dynamic of its own, which underpi.nned the emergence 
of alternative land tenure and utilization arrangements, par- 
ticularly in the context of the expanding frontier. There, 
smallholders thriving on the production of diverse agricultural 
products became a preponderant element of social, organiza- 
tion. These processes undermined the near monopoly of land and 
labor traditionally claimed by the fazendeiros. The social dif- 
ferentiation inherent in these processes included the appearance 
of alt'ernative elites with economic and political interests in 
land markets and regional development. In fact, without coali- 
t'ions with these power holders it is doubtful that immigrants 
could have come to exercise effective ownership of the land, or 
that the alternative economy would have grown so fast. 
CHANGES -- IN THE COMMERCIAL SYSTEM 
Even as the larbe established planter was losing ground to 
new forces in the adjudication of land and labor among alterna- 
tive uses, he could still feel confident that his control of the 
commercial channels in the state through the comissario was an 
insurmountable barrier guaranteeing his hold on coffee produc- 
tion. This commercial advantage was doubly -insured by what he 
perceived as his ability to produce at lower prices given the 
"industrial" scale of the fazenda. The large fazenda was thought 
to be superior since it had enough capital to buy expensive 
coffee processing machinery, making its production of better 
quality. Besides, large planters exercised a great deal of con- 
trol over the railroad system, the main transportation network. 
He seems to have been wrongon all counts. Side by side the 
established comissario system there emerged an alternative com- 
mercial network linking small holders in the interior to the ex- 
port houses of Santos. The nodal points in this network were com- 
mercial intermediaries operating in the towns of the interior. 
The typical arrangement was for an operator to set a small plant 
for the processing(beneficiamento) of - coffee whereby he would 
also offer to buy the coffee from the small holder(see e.g. Dean 
1977: 56,156-157). This way, the operator served as buyer and 
intermediary for an entire subregion. He would buy the 
unprocessed green coffee, "benefit" and standardize the beans, 
and sell to higher level merchants connected to Santos opera- 
tives. The area of Presidente Prudente provides a representative 
example. There the commercial mediation of coffee was done via 
the "maquinista" or owner-operator of coffee processing 
machines(maquinas de beneficiamento) and buyers representing 
firms in the city of S3o Paulo as well as those of Santos(Santos 
Abreu 1972: 159-160). All production was sold through these local . 
plant-warehouses linked to general wholesale or retail trade. 
The formation of an alternative trading network was aided by 
the decision of some buyers in Santos to purchase coffee in the 
interior. rather than through Santos-based comissarios. The latter 
bitterly complained of this change, but were unable to prevent 
buyers from sending agents to the towns of the interior to buy 
directly from growers or low level commercial intermediaries. 
~okissarios had actually gained the upper hand in their al- 
liance with planters when the latter became indebted to them 
after the expansive boom starting in the 1880's met a collapse in 
coffee prices in the late 1890's--and then a full-fledged crisis 
of overproduction after the turn of the century(eventual1y 
responsible for the historic valorization program of 1906). 
Planters found themselves deeply indebted after having carried 
out the expansion with loans advanced by the comissario. 
However, when the crisis intensified at the turn of the century, 
Santos intermediaries found themselves unable to continue to per- 
form adequately the credit and banking functions they had assumed 
earlier. It is at . ,  this juncture that foreign capital-- 
particularly British--began.to penetrate deeply into the commer- 
cial system. In 1903 the British established the Companhia de Ar- 
mazens Gerais(Faust0 1977: 2 1 2 1 ,  followed by the Companhia 
Registradora de Santos in 1905 and the Companhia Paulista de Ar- 
mazens Gerais in 1909(see also Love 1977 and Holloway 1974: 
45). The foreign "exporter" was displacing the c'omissario from 
the key financing and warehousing functions in the export sec- 
tor. Through the armazens qerais, so-called "warrants" were is- 
sued upon deposit of coffee which in turn ,could be "discounted" 
into more liquid form. Towards 1.910 foreign export firms and the 
armazens gerais di-splaced most of the comissario houses from the 
export business per se as well. 
National control of the key commercial aspects of the coffee 
economy. was made even more precarious by the foreign penetration 
in the banking and financial system. Love(1977: 62-63) estimates 
that by 1920 two thirds of the banking business was in foreign 
hands. This hold had been actually reinforced when the valoriza- 
tion scheme of 1908 granted foreign financiers direct control 
over huge stocks of Brazilian coffee, and made them recipients of 
guaranteed interest income from the loans advanced therein(see 
Holloway 1975 and 1974: 45, Cano 1977). According to 
Oliveira(1977) this "financial-commercial intermediation" became 
so pivotal in the export sector that it became a dominant prin- 
ciple of surplus extraction. 
While this external factor was important, the more insidious 
challenge to the traditional larger planter-comissario alliance 
came from the alternative commercial channels emerging "internal- 
ly" as a result of the appearance of a significant small holding 
system in coffee. 
The new network of coffee trading was not built up from 
scratch but relied on that which had already sprung for trading 
on the food staples also produced by small holders and colonos -- 
corn, beans, rice; and, later, raw cotton. In the first census 
making an effort to list the number of processing stations in the 
interior, that of 1920, almost all such establishments which had 
coffee as first activity also listed processing at least one of 
the other staples, particularly rice and beans. A focal market 
place for large scale transactions involving these items had been 
the commercial networks eventually giving birth to the Bolsa de 
Mercadorias(l918) and Bolsa de Cereaes(l923) of the city of S3o 
Paulo. It was through these commercial networks involving 
Paulistano merchants that much of the coffee of small holders not 
bought in the interior was sold to national buyers and exporters. 
In 1921 city merchants successfully won a quota to ship coffee to 
Santos. In 1923, when another quota system limiting entries into 
Santos was being set, the ACS denounced and protested vigorously 
the fact that more than 400 agents had registered in SBo Paulo 
requesting part of the quota. Although this was a very delicate 
matter at the time, these Paulistano merchants lobbied throughout 
the decade for the organization of an official Bolsa de ~ a f b  in 
the city of S3o Paulo, parallel to that in Santos. 
The "legitimate" coffee merchants, belonging to the Commer- 
cial Association of Santos(Associaq30 Comercial de ~antos--ACS), 
resented this development. In the early 1920's the pro-comissario 
"A Gazeta" and other spokesmen of the traditional planter- 
comissario alliance blamed the Bolsa de Mercadorias of S3o 
Paulo--and the annex Caixa de Liquida~Bo--for "the financial and 
economic disequilibrium of the productive classes." 
Commercial intermediaries and buyers dealing with small 
holders were at an advantage over established merchants. Small 
holders produced at lower costs, ceteris paribus, while had no 
credit facilities or control of the commercial process; thus, 
they were compelled to sell at lower prices. In part because of 
this, prices were driven downward in the interior. 
Small growers were able to sell cheaper not only because 
their lands tended to be located in the "new" areas to the 
west. They also took better care of trees, perhaps the most cru- 
cial factor affecting output outside the quality of land. The 
most .telling evidence in this regard are the conclusions reached 
in 1924 by a scientific team commissioned to study ways of con- 
taining the coffee disease stephanoderes coffeae. One of their 
most important conclusions was that small holders, even those in 
the established areas of the old west, were better able than 
fazendas to combat the disease. Comparing groves in the same 
.- 
regions, those of small holders were found to exhibit a lower in- 
cidence of the disease and better rates of recovery. This was at- 
tributed to their ability to give the trees the care which fazen- 
das claimed they could not due to high labor costs. This conclu- -
sion is also supported by the known differentials in production 
costs observed for different regions. 
The social differentiation represented by small holders was 
diffuse over the entire texture of the Paulista society. Yet, 
small holders thrived the most in the dynamic areas of recent 
colonization(See Appendix, Part 11: Tables). As shown in Chart 1 ,  
the social structure in these new areas--in terms of c.lass, ur- 
banization, political organization, and the like--was substan- 
tially different and at odds with that of established large 
fazenda areas. 
CHART 1 
.. CONTRASTS IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE EMERGING IN SAO 
PAULO'S COFFEE ZONE BY THE EARLY 1920's. 
DIMENSION 1 .  I OLD WEST NEW WEST 
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CONCLUSION: SEGMENTATION - AND CONTROL OF THE EXPORT SECTOR 
The main conclusion of this study is that the expansion of 
the Paulista coffee export sector in the western plateau of the 
state after the 1880's produced a segmental pattern of social or- 
ganization which made the very question of control of the sector 
became problematic and laden with potential conflict. By the ear- 
ly 19201s, an alternative coalition--made up of a growing mass of 
small and medium holders, land developers, new commercial inter- 
mediaries and professional politicians--was successfully chal- 
lenging the established alliance between large planters and 
comissarios. The keystone of the new coalition was the group of 
urban middle and upper classes involved in the trading of 
agricultural products and coffee(see also Dean 1977: 156,182) : 
The challenge meant that neither large planters nor comis- 
sarios were able to exercise full control over critical resources 
such as labor and land--or even the process of surplus appropria- 
tion. It was precisely the large coffee estate's failure to make 
the colonato a source of a stable, permanent and'cheap(al1 costs 
considered) labor force what came to play a central role in the 
. emergence of the small holding system underpinning the pluraliza- 
tion and segmentation of elite interests. 
The threat was even more direct: the higher commercial 
profits made possible by lower small holder selling prices were 
facilitating a displacement from production to commerce as the 
predominant locus of surplus extraction. Commercial profit, 
rather than that derived from production, was fast becoming the 
major source of elite income and capital accumulation. Yet, 
planters and their comissario allies were not able to control the 
commercial mechanisms of appropriation of surplus; the inter- 
mediation between national producer and foreign buyer was being 
increasingly performed by alternative national and foreign inter- 
mediaries and financiers battling for lion shares in the commer- 
cial(and financial) arena. 
Considering also the high rate of surplus appropriation 
being realized via the external financing of coffee valorization 
programs(0liveira 1977), we can conclude that the large fazenda 
was becoming tangled in a wider web of dependent relations which 
undermined its claim to predominance and hegemony. According to 
/ 
Holloway(1974: 2661, planters' profits--exclusive of interest 
payments on borrowed capital--had decreased to 9% as the second 
and third decades of the century worn on, while interests on 
loans had risen to 12, 18 and 24%. 
As a result of segmentation, all major functional areas 
within the sector--production, commerce, financing, even 
transportation--were becoming internally differentiated into com- 
peting sub-groups(Font 1982). Consensus of interests 'within any 
functional group was hampered; instead, cross-functional economic 
coalitions emerged as the main actors vying for dominant shares 
of the export sector. 
The conflict between segments took a variety of forms: be- 
tween or within functional groups and, particularly, as sectoral 
or regional antagonisms(Simonsen 1940 :76). The areas in the New 
West were gaining in relative weight over older ones--in terms of 
coffee as well as food crops and, later, cotton. The displace- 
ment of the economic center of gravity in the state generated 
powerful economic and political tensions between regions. 
These antagonisms and processes of di-fferentiation were 
projected into the political process itself. The main vehicle was 
the associational ferment noted at the beginning of this es- 
say. In this regard one of the most interesting results o f  this 
study is that the state's political apparatus came t o  emerge as 
no passive or even neutral bystander. Policies adopted with 
respect to the important questions of land use and colonization, 
immigration, transportation and public administration--while of- 
ten contradictory or unclear--expressed and reinforced the forma- 
tion of an alternative coffee-based economy side by side with the 
large fazenda(Font 1982). As argued elsewhere(Font 19821, at the 
same time the state pursued its own emergent interests in the 
critical relation between the export economy and international 
financial markets.. No wonder the expressions of planter col1ec'- 
tive contention. 
In the context of pluralization of elite income sources and 
interests, the state government emerged as the one actor capable 
of playing the key role in deciding the relative fate of these 
segments--and thus in shaping the subsequent path of development 
along which the Paulista society would move. By favoring the 
development of newer areas where the small holder prevailed, the 
state appears to have joined new economic groups challenging the 
predominance and hegemony of the large fazenda. In passing let's 
note that the involvement of industrial groups(Font 1982) inter- 
ested in the development of the internal market gave this emer- 
gent coalition a broader structural meaning. 
This is not to say that the state was becoming "dominant" 
over civil society, generating by decree its large scale trans- 
formation. Far from it. The key dynamics was provided by the 
segmentation in the social organization of the export 'sector 
brought about by its own development--in interaction with proces- 
ses of incipient industrialization. Rather than to neat integra- 
tion under a stable fazenda system, this overall pattern of 
development led to growing tensions between various elements of 
an increasingly complex Paulista political economy. It does seem 
the case that the state found itself increasingly able to deal 
proactively, and not merely reflectively, with respect to the 
heterogeneous and complex Paulista society. Politics was fast be- 
coming the pivotal arena for the adjudication among competing 
models of social organization and change. 
The large fazenda was far from displaced. On the con- 
trary. As argued elsewhere(Font 19821, the key to understanding 
the decade of the 1920's in S%o Paulo is precisely the attempt of 
traditional export elites to restore their full predominance and 
hegemony. 
At a more general level, these findings lend considerable 
weight to the idea that expansion of an export. sector may 
generate complex processes of differentiation(0f interests, so- 
cial organization and action) powerful enough to undermine the 
claims to predominance and hegemony by emergent bourgeoisies. 
The focus on dynamic processes of social organization and collec- 
tive action in export sectors thus emerges as a promising new ap- 
proach to study the social and political aspects of development 
in Latin America. 
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